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ABSTRACT
The answer to the question ‘who am I?’ is of fundamental importance to being human. Answers 
to this question have traditionally been sought from various disciplines and sources, which 
include empirical sources, such as biology and sociology, and phenomenological sources, 
such as psychology and religion. Although the approaches are varied, they have the notion of 
foundational truth, whether from an objective or subjective perspective, in common. The question 
of human identity that is the subject of this paper is germinated from the title of a book by WITS 
academic, Ivor Chipkin, entitled, Do South Africans exist? Nationalism, democracy and the identity of 
‘the people’ (2007). This paper does not discuss Chipkin’s thoughts on nationalism and democracy; 
however, it considered the matter of human identity that is raised by his question. The approach 
taken by this paper on the notion of identity was significantly influenced by Brian McLaren’s 
postmodernist approach to Christian doctrine as outlined in his book A generous orthodoxy 
(2004) – a term coined by Yale Theologian, Hans Frei. The inadequacies of traditional approaches 
to human identity and consciousness that are based upon ‘foundational knowledge’ were thus 
considered. Both subjective and objective approaches to identity were touched upon, showing the 
weaknesses of these approaches in dealing with the complex nature of true human identity. The 
paper then presented an integrative framework for individual consciousness that is not static or 
ultimately quantifiable, but rather formulated in the process of mutual discovery that arises from 
a shared journey. The approach presented here drew strongly upon the groundbreaking work of 
Ken Wilber and Eugene de Quincey and related their ontological systems to the intersubjective 
approach to identity that can be found in the African philosophy and theology of ‘ubuntu’. 
This paper focused on how the ethics and theology of this indigenous knowledge system can 
contribute toward overcoming the impasse of validating individual identity in contemporary 
academic debates on human consciousness.
INTRODUCTION
Research into human consciousness and individual identity is very much in vogue in the academy at the 
moment. Scholars in a wide range of disciplines are seeking to approach the mystery and complexity 
of human consciousness and individual identity from different angles, each hoping to add some new 
insight and further our knowledge of the human self. 
John Mbiti writes the following telling line in the preface of his groundbreaking book Concepts of God in 
Africa, ‘African peoples are not religiously illiterate’ (1970:xiii). This statement would seem to express 
an element of common sense that should be evident to all. However, the reality is that most theological 
debates, and particularly interdisciplinary debates in theology and science, are dominated by insights 
and wisdom that comes from Europe and America.
There are many, including myself, who share Mbiti’s perspective that Africa has a valuable treasure 
chest of insight to offer to the world in relation to debates on identity and consciousness. One of the most 
courageous leaders during the South African struggle for liberation from apartheid, Steve Biko (1978), 
wrote these words before his untimely death:
… [Western society] seems to be very concerned with perfecting their technological know-how while losing out 
on their spiritual dimension. We believe that in the long run the special contribution to the world by Africa 
will be in this field of human relationship. The great powers of the world may have done wonders in giving 
the world an industrial and military look, but the great gift still has to come from Africa – giving the world 
a more human face. 
(Biko 1978:46)
It is precisely the element of true humanity, or ‘humaneness’, that this paper wishes to deal with from 
the perspective of the African ethic of ‘ubuntu’, here referred to as a ‘generous ontology’. There are 
few African indigenous knowledge systems that are as well known, and as critically regarded, as the 
southern African concept of ‘ubuntu’. 
This paper argues the point that the southern African ethics of ‘ubuntu’, as it relates to the concepts 
of ontological being and identity, can add a new perspective to the debate of true identity and what 
it means to be a human person in relation to other human persons. It is hoped that this offering will 
stimulate some thought and conversation, open new avenues of enquiry and research, and go some way 
towards legitimising a seldom heard vocabulary in the field of identity and consciousness – namely, the 
African theological perspective. Boldly overstated, it may even offer some insights into long perplexing 
aspects of consciousness-validating approaches that have been almost exclusively offered from the 
Western, scientifically dominated, epistemological approach to human-being. 
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TOWARDS A ‘GENEROUS ONTOLOGY’
The famed Austrian psychologist, Victor Frankl (1984) wrote: 
Man’s [sic] search for meaning is the primary motivation in his 
life and not a ‘secondary rationalization’ of instinctual drives. This 
meaning is unique and specific in that it must and can be fulfilled 
by him alone; only then does it achieve a significance which will 
satisfy his own will to meaning. 
(Frankl 1984:120)
The notion of identity has always been central to the human 
person’s understanding of self and the relation of that self to the 
rest of the Kosmos.1 The question ‘who am I?’ is fundamental 
to human existence and particularly so for persons of faith. 
Answers to this question have come from a wide range of 
disciplines; philosophers, theologians, scientists, sociologists 
and anthropologists have all sought to offer some insights. To 
be able to identify and place one’s self within the world is a 
crucial element of one’s wellbeing. Ontologically, it shapes the 
image we have of ourselves, as well as our relation to others, 
and ultimately informs our understanding of the place we 
understand ourselves to occupy within the whole of the Kosmos.
The advent of postmodernism has caused the once firm 
foundations of identity to become somewhat uncertain. Galadriel 
of Middle Earth comments at the opening of the cinematic 
version of JRR Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings, ‘The world is changed. 
I feel it in the water. I feel it in the earth. I smell it in the air. Much 
that once was, is lost, for none now live who remember it’.2 In 
a similar vein, Franke remarks on the theological certainties of 
previous ages noting that the world is changing, ‘strange things 
are happening in unexpected places, long-familiar assumptions 
are being called into question…’ (cited in McLaren 2004:13). 
Where one was once able to give an absolute answer to the 
question ‘who am I?’, there is now no longer absolute certainty. 
None of the dominant approaches to individual identity 
previously considered as authoritative can fully satisfy the 
complexity of what it means to be who you truly are. In short, 
the various approaches, which will be discussed below, have 
shown that a comprehensive, all-inclusive, answer that can fully 
answer the question ‘who am I?’ is illusive. One cannot say ‘I 
am…’ without the necessity of qualifying that by saying ‘but, 
I am also…’. The rigid categories of modernity simply fail to 
take into account the richness of diversity and experience that 
comprise the rich tapestry of contributing factors that shape our 
individual and collective identity.
Whilst each of the answers that are given to the question ‘who 
am I?’ do add some valuable insight and help to answer a part 
of what is asked, each answer is simultaneously inadequate 
in answering another part of this complex question. Some 
scholars have reacted negatively against the uncertainty raised 
by the questioning of these previously unquestionable ‘truths’ 
about identity, particularly among theologians who have often 
claimed a special relationship to ‘absolute’ knowledge and 
truth. However, postmodern considerations do not contribute 
a rejection of truth, knowledge, or rationality, but, rather, a 
rethinking of rationality, and truth, in the wake of modernity.
This rethinking has resulted not in irrationality, as is often 
claimed by less informed critics of postmodern thought, but 
rather in numerous redescriptions and proposals concerning the 
understanding of rationality and knowledge. These postmodern 
ideas produced a more inherently self-critical view of knowledge 
than modernity. 
(Franke cited in McLaren 2004:14)
1.Snyman suggests that the use of the word Kosmos to describe the non-dual 
universe, rather than the ‘anaemic, depth-denying and surface bound “cosmos” of 
modern science’ is of much importance in theology (2002:71). He concurs with the 
work of Ken Wilber when he notes that the word ‘cosmos’, ‘has not allowed room for 
spirit and consciousness in its deliberations’ (2002:71).
2.This remarkable quotation is used by John R. Franke in McLaren 2004:13.
One of the great struggles in both science and theology, and often 
the primary source of the impasse that exists between these two 
complementary disciplines, is the understanding that each holds 
certain knowledge that is foundationally true. If one investigates 
the philosophical bases of theories of consciousness and 
identity from both the objectivist and subjectivist approaches, 
one is likely to find some element of what the philosophers call 
‘foundationalism’. This refers to an understanding of knowledge 
(i.e. that which informs our statements of truth about ‘things’) 
that emerged during the Enlightenment. Franke explains that it 
arose out of an attempt to avoid the ‘uncertainty generated by the 
human tendency toward error and to overcome the inevitable, 
often destructive disagreements and controversies that 
followed’ (cited in McLaren 2004:14). This question to ascertain 
‘certainties’ that could not be contested involved a paradigm 
shift in thinking, and research, that reconstructed bodies of 
knowledge in varying spheres (including theology and the 
sciences) by rejecting ‘pre-modern’ notions of absolute authority 
and replacing them with incontestable beliefs accessible to all 
individuals. ‘The assumptions of foundationalism, with its 
goal of establishing certain and universal knowledge, came to 
dominate intellectual pursuit in the modern era’ (Franke cited in 
McLaren 2004:15).
This approach to knowledge and truth has become so pervasive 
that most persons fall back on it almost unquestioningly. If I 
were to ask you ‘who are you?’, you would probably answer 
with some form of individual validation of who you know and 
believe yourself to be. In all likelihood, this would either relate 
to your body and your brain (what you look like and feel like 
and how you associate that with being yourself). You may, 
for example, answer, ‘I am David’, because that is who you 
psychologically ‘feel’ yourself to be and it is more than likely 
how you visualise your physical appearance – the experience 
of being ‘yourself’ is an experience that is common to almost 
all sentient beings. However, what if I reply, ‘ok, but there are 
many Davids in the world, which one are you?’ In answer to this 
you may need to make some objective statement, in addition to 
your earlier subjective belief, in order to qualify why you believe 
yourself to be a particular ‘David’, for example you may say, 
‘I am the short David with brown hair and green eyes’. Again, 
you are appealing to a modernist foundational category of 
knowledge (your measurement of height, the colour of your hair 
and eyes) and your assumption is that these things mean the 
same thing to me as they do to you. Or, you may make some 
subjective statement to qualify why you believe yourself to be 
a particular ‘David’, for example, you may say, ‘I am the David 
who remembers growing up as the son of Martha and Dan in 
Durban’. Here your assumption is that, by locating yourself in 
relationship to your parents, I will draw on the foundational 
knowledge of being a son to a parent and so agree that if they 
validate your identity it must be trustworthy and true. Most 
persons would accept this as a perfectly reasonable answer, 
believing that you are, in fact, the person that you claim to be, 
because you have offered either personal, objective, or subjective, 
‘evidence’ of that fact.
However, identity is no longer a matter that is so easily verifiable. 
THE INADEQUACIES OF FOUNDATIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE 
The conundrum of individual self-validating 
consciousness in a world of confusing ‘truths’
Ray Kurzweil asks the pertinent question, ‘Am I the stuff in my 
brain and body?’ (cited in Richards 2002:42). In other words, 
is the stuff of ‘my brain and body’ a convincing explanation of 
who I am in the light of credible discoveries and developments 
in contemporary science and technology? Kurzweil makes two 
basic observations about the inadequacy of such an approach to 
identity.
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Firstly, he points to basic misunderstandings of permanence 
and physicality. This misunderstanding of permanence is 
highlighted in the light of developments in quantum theory and 
quantum physics. He writes: ‘Consider that the particles making 
up my body and brain are constantly changing. We are not all 
permanent collections of particles’ (cited in Richards 2002:42). 
The notion of ‘non-permanence’, expressed by Kurzweil above, 
is a plausible scientific understanding of the ever-changing 
nature of physical matter. In particular, the work of quantum 
physicist David Bohm has shown that physical reality is an ever-
changing movement of constituent elements that we understand 
to make up physical matter. Bohm calls this movement the 
‘holomovement’ (Bohm 1980:185). In summary, he suggests 
that all of creation (Bohm’s explicate order, i.e. observable, 
or physical reality) is an ever-changing manifestation of a 
far greater reality (Bohm’s implicate order, i.e. the unseen, 
underlying, subtle reality). The explicate order is constantly 
in a state of change because it continually comes out of, and 
moves back into, the implicate order. Thus, Bohm’s view is 
that all material reality is an explication of a vast number of 
implicate orders. Bohm maintains that underlying the explicate 
order (what has traditionally been understood to be a static and 
constant physical reality), is a ‘deeper order of existence, a vast 
and more primary level of reality that gives birth to all objects 
and appearances of our physical world’ (cited in Talbot 1991:46; 
cf. Zohar 1991:54). Hence, this world view would maintain 
that what we perceive as physical reality is not a number of 
separate, self-contained static objects, which form the sum of 
the total of their meaning and identity (as is suggested in the 
Cartesian/Newtonian world view), but, rather, that reality is a 
dynamic whole in a constant state of change; an explication of 
the undivided whole that is in a perpetual state of flux3 (Bohm 
1980:185). Based on such an understanding of reality, Kurzweil 
writes the following in relation to the misconception of basing 
identity, and an understanding of self, on the perception of a 
static physical being (physical permanence):
The cells in our bodies turn over at different rates, but the particles 
(e.g. atoms and molecules) that comprise our cells are exchanged 
at a very rapid rate. I am just not the same collection of particles 
that I was even a month ago. It is the pattern of matter and energy 
that are semipermanent (that is, changing only gradually), but 
our actual content is changing constantly, and very quickly. We 
are like patterns that water makes in a stream. The rushing water 
around a formation of rocks makes a particular, unique pattern. 
This pattern may remain relatively unchanged for hours, even 
years. Of course, the actual material constituting the pattern – 
the water – is replaced in milliseconds. The same is true for Ray 
Kurzweil. Like the water in a stream, my particles are constantly 
changing, but the pattern that people recognize as Ray has a 
reasonable level of continuity. This argues that we should not 
associate our fundamental identity with a specific set of particles… 
(cited in Richards 2002:42–43)
Few theologians would challenge the central thought expressed 
in the view above, namely, that individual human identity and 
consciousness can be entirely contained within, or verified 
through, what is perceived to be static physical being. Kurzweil 
also raises a further interesting question about identifying 
one’s self with one’s body when he discusses what he calls the 
‘gradual replacement theory’ (in Richards 2002:44). For example, 
if I have surgery to have a lens replacement in my eyes, does 
that make me less ‘me’? Let’s say that, together with the need for 
eye surgery, my hearing has become impaired and so I have a 
cochlear implant fitted; does that mean that I am even less ‘me’? 
Most of us would say no to this question. What makes us who 
we are is not only what we look like, or feel like (in terms of 
3.Along with Bohm 1980, see also Keepin 1993 and Talbot 1991:43–48 for a more 
detailed discussion of Bohm’s theory of the implicate and explicate orders. The 
intricate technical details of this view are not a necessary component in furthering 
the argument that Kurzweil uses to show the complexity of human identity and 
consciousness. However, it is necessary to refer to these theories in brief in order to 
substantiate the scientific credibility of Kurzweil’s thesis.
touch and shape) in our bodies, it is something deeper and more 
significant that has to do with what goes on inside of our minds 
– there is a measure of ‘consciousness’ attached to identity.
If this thesis is accepted then it must mean that a purely objective 
approach to identity is inadequate, because what I see and feel 
about myself is constantly changing and so cannot constitute the 
entirety of who I am. Who I am must thus also have something 
to do with who I experience, know, and feel myself to be (i.e. 
subjectivist criteria of validation).
Kurzweil’s challenge of the validation of individual 
consciousness and identity anticipates this and so his objection 
is not only founded upon objectivist scientific theories. This 
is his second argument, namely, in addition to the above, he 
introduces the possibility of doubt in relation to subjectivist 
criteria for the validation of individual identity. 
Let me explain what is meant by a subjectivist approach to 
validating individual identity. If I cannot say ‘I am the short 
David with the brown hair’, because these objective elements of 
validating who I am are in a constant state of change, or have 
been swapped out for parts that were not a part of the original 
‘me’, then there must be some other way of identifying that I am 
truly the David I believe myself to be. As a further complication 
to your statement of identity, ‘I am the short David with the 
brown hair’, I may say ‘but I know two Davids who are short 
with brown hair, how do you know you really are the David 
you believe yourself to be?’ Most persons, when confronted 
with such a probing question, would revert to subjectivist data 
to validate who they truly are. For example, David may say ‘I 
know that I am David because I have David’s memories, I feel 
like David feels, therefore I know that I am me’.
The element of doubt in relation to subjectivist criteria for the 
validation of individual identity is even more plausible if one 
can create some form of emulative technology that so accurately 
and completely emulated David’s subjective characteristics that 
this technology itself is convinced of its subjective ‘David-ness’.4 
Kurzweil postulates that if this emulative machine also believed 
itself to be David, based on the same set of subjectivist criteria 
(i.e. it has been programmed with the ‘real’ David’s memory, 
feelings, experiences, consciousness etc.), it could lead to an 
identity crisis. The gist of Kurzweil’s argument is as follows: if a 
machine is programmed to believe that it is a particular person, 
in this instance the person is ‘David’, how will an interrogator be 
able to ascertain who the real ‘David’ truly is when questioning 
both the human subject and the emulated version of the human 
subject? The crux of the matter is that both the human ‘David’ 
and the emulated ‘David’ draw on the same set of data and 
stimuli that validate their identity. that is, both would say, and 
believe, that they are truly the real ‘David’ because they both 
have a memory of being ‘David’; both feel like the real ‘David’ 
and both have the conscious experience of being a particular 
person named ‘David’. The question, in this instance, is thus 
what subjective data could the ‘real’ David draw on in order to 
convince the interrogator that he truly is the ‘only real David’? 
If the emulation of David is sufficiently detailed and accurate, 
there should be no extra subjective data that could aid the ‘real 
David’ in verifying his true identity.
In summary, this hypothetical identity conundrum highlights 
a number of deficiencies in the way in which scholarship in 
objective and subjective approaches to identity has dealt with 
the notion of individual identity and the validation of such 
identity. 
So studies of, and approaches toward, an understanding of the 
notion of ‘self’ have generally fallen into two broad categories. 
4.It will not be possible to discuss the plausibility of the development of technologies 
that could be capable of this level of accurate emulation in a study of this nature. 
However, for a detailed discussion of the subject please see Forster 2006:39–91.
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These are, (1) subjective approaches that seek to validate 
individual identity by drawing on data obtained from within 
the individual (psychology and spirituality are two of the most 
commonly known approaches in this regard) and (2) objective 
approaches that seek to validate how the individual constructs 
his or her identity through observing the subject in relation to 
his or her surroundings and influences. These could even be 
observable biological influences such as brain function, or social 
interaction with other persons or the environment (sociology and 
neuroscience are the two most commonly known approaches in 
this regard). However, both of these approaches have a common 
problem – the reliability of foundational knowledge; it can no 
longer be assumed that persons understand and attach the same 
meaning to what a certain discipline, or community, or faith, 
considers unquestionably true. 
What is needed is thus not a new set of incontestable foundational 
truths relating to identity, but rather, a more generous ontology! 
By this I mean an ontology that is open enough to learn from 
both objective and subjective discoveries, yet is not limited by 
the truths of these discoveries. Rather, a generous ontology 
recognises that truth is neither static, nor absolute and, as such, 
identity is developmental and complexly related to aspects of 
being that are not only subjectively experienced or objectively 
observed.
In relation to the hypothetical identity conundrum discussed 
above, none of these approaches is able to offer a satisfactory 
approach that is sufficient in aiding the interrogator in deciding 
which of the two interview subjects is truly ‘David’.
THE DEFICIENCIES OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
SUBJECTIVIST AND OBJECTIVIST 
APPROACHES
I am not saying that individual subjectivist and objectivist 
approaches to identity are completely without merit. In most 
common situations, one is able to gain some sense of who one is 
simply by relating to one’s body, or one’s conscious awareness 
of self.
However, as was briefly shown above, there are some 
fundamental weaknesses in these approaches toward individual 
identity. Whilst the subjectivist approaches to consciousness 
and identity are valuable in identifying, contemplating and 
interpreting internal experience and knowledge of self, they are 
very difficult to verify. The knowledge itself, which is used in the 
subjectivist approach, is exactly as it is described – subjective. It 
is fundamentally valid for the individual, but very difficult to 
verify objectively. Hence, some further approach is necessary to 
validate individual identity and consciousness in this context.
On the other hand, the objectivist approaches to consciousness 
and individual identity may be easily quantifiable through 
observing and comparing the observed data to what is known or 
expected (whether it be outward appearance, social behaviour, 
or the neurological functioning of the brain). However, such 
approaches can clearly not do away with the conundrum that 
is raised by Kurzweil (i.e. is what we see about ourselves really 
the same as what we believe it to be?). And, if I change elements 
of myself (such as lenses, implants, artificial limbs) does that 
truly mean that I am less ‘me’? Clearly there is a need for a 
more comprehensive approach to validating consciousness and 
individual identity.
It is also worth noting that whilst there may be some value in 
using both objective and subjective approaches to individual 
identity together, such an approach cannot solve the identity 
conundrum. The fundamental struggle is not just with subjective 
or objective data. Rather, the struggle lies in the fact that both 
the subjective and the objectivist approaches to consciousness, 
which are discussed above, rely on the observation of passive 
knowledge (I am, or I know, or I feel). It is passive because it 
is either an observation of something that is (physical shape, 
biological functioning of the brain etc.), or a reflection on 
something that exists apart from the observer (a memory, a 
feeling, a thought etc.). Passive knowledge is simply too easy 
to emulate and recreate for it to offer any plausible approach 
to undeniably verify one’s true individual identity. What 
is required is some form of engagement with the notion of 
identity that is more than just an observation of, or reflection 
upon, passive data. What is required is some form of active 
engagement with the reality of being truly human.
In essence, what is required is ‘being in relationship with’, which 
is active, rather than just ‘being’, which is passive. Relationships 
are living, dynamic, fluid and constantly changing. A relationship 
cannot be fundamentally ‘characterised’ or quantified, neither 
can it be wholly experienced or explained. Relationships require 
‘generous’ discoveries and a constant reinterpretation to glean 
elements of truth – truths that may change from moment to 
moment.
A GENEROUS DISCOVERY THAT HAS NO 
END: AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH TO 
INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY
One of the most innovative and systematically expressed 
attempts at such a model of consciousness comes from the 
integral theorist and theologian Ken Wilber. Snyman (2002)
comments that Wilber’s objective in developing an integrated 
approach to consciousness was to,
… impart a clear and precise understanding of the way 
consciousness develops and interrelates with other aspects of 
the universe, which includes all the vast depths of not only the 
physical, but also the psychological, spiritual, cultural and 
sociological ‘Kosmos’.
(Snyman 2002:71)
In Wilber’s formulation, an instance of consciousness (e.g. a 
moment of conscious self identity as expressed in a statement 
of identity such as  ‘I am’) is framed within a much broader 
holarchy. Wilber traces the etymology of the word ‘holarchy’ 
from the Latin hiero, meaning sacred or holy, and arch, which 
means governance or rule (1995:17). The notion of hierarchies, 
in theology, was most notably articulated by the 6th-century 
Christian mystic, Dionysius the Areopagite, who used the 
term to refer to nine celestial orders, with Seraphim and 
Cherubim at the top and archangels and angels at the bottom. 
In this schema, the notion of hierarchy was intended to refer to 
higher levels of virtue and illumination that could be accessible 
through contemplative awareness. As philosophy and theology 
influenced politics and science in subsequent years, this notion 
of hierarchy became common in a multitude of disciplines. 
Wilber (1995) sums up the contemporary understanding and use 
of the term as follows:
As used in modern psychology, evolutionary theory, and systems 
theory, a hierarchy is simply a ranking of orders of events ‘according 
to their holistic capacity’. In any developmental sequence, what is 
whole at one stage becomes a part of a larger whole at the next 
stage. A letter is part of a whole word, which is part of a whole 
sentence, which is part of a whole paragraph, and so on. 
(Wilber 1995:17)
This notion applies not only to linguistic or representative forms 
(such as writing or script), it is also widely accepted in empirical 
disciplines, such as biology and physics, that deal with the forms 
themselves. Howard Gardner gives the following example of 
such an approach in biology:
Any change in an organism will affect all the parts; no aspect of a 
structure can be altered without affecting the entire structure; each 
whole contains part and is itself part of a larger whole. 
(cited in Wilber 1995:17)
Essentially, that which is a whole in one context, yet at the same 
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time is a part of another context, is called a ‘holon’. Wilber (1995) 
says that reality
… is not composed of things or processes; it is not composed of 
atoms or quarks, it is not composed of wholes nor does it have 
any parts. Rather, it is composed of whole/parts, or holons. This 
is true of atoms, cells, symbols, ideas. They can be understood 
neither as things nor processes, neither as wholes nor parts, but 
only as simultaneous whole/parts, so that standard ‘atomistic’ and 
‘wholistic’ attempts are both way off the mark. There is nothing 
that isn’t a holon … Before an atom is an atom, it is a holon. Before 
a cell is a cell, it is a holon. Before an idea is an idea, it is a holon. 
All of them are wholes that exist in other wholes, and thus they 
are all whole/parts, or holons, first (long before any particular 
characteristics are singled out by us). 
 (Wilber 1995:33–34)
Contained in Wilber’s understanding of holons are two 
underlying conceptual frameworks. Firstly, there is the notion 
of inclusion, in which each holon is a part that is simultaneously 
a whole. Secondly, such a view necessitates some concept of 
hierarchy, where parts are included into, and superseded by, 
a greater whole. Whereas the first concept mentioned above is 
understood as a ‘holon’, the second concept of a hierarchy of 
such holons is understood to be a ‘Holarchy’. Snyman (2002) 
sums up Wilber’s conceptual framework as follows:
The whole is always more than the sum of the parts precisely 
because it provides the means by which the parts are held together. 
Without this principle, one would be left with isolated parts, or 
only ‘heaps’ instead of ‘wholes’. 
 (Snyman 2002:77)
Wilber’s notion of holarchies stresses the fundamental 
interdependence of the elements in both ascending and 
descending order. Higher orders are fundamentally dependent 
upon the inclusion of lower orders; the value of a higher order is 
found in the value of the lower orders. For example, one cannot 
produce an emotive poem without sentences which, themselves, 
require words and one cannot have words without the letters of 
the alphabet. The sequencing of lower orders to higher orders 
is an indispensable aspect of the Holarchy. Each holon is both 
a part and a whole at the same time. The poem as a whole 
cannot exist without the words, yet the words cannot convey the 
meaning of the poem without being included into its poetic and 
expressive structure.
Thus, the development of holons (or whole/parts) has to occur 
in stages, which, themselves, occur sequentially from lesser 
to greater wholes. However, this growth does not devalue or 
disempower any higher or lower stage of the Holarchy. The 
essence of Wilber’s multilevelled approach to consciousness is 
that it stresses that true identity can never be validated simply 
by appealing to one level of being. 
In the context of this research, I could not truly validate my 
identity simply by appealing to faculties, experiences and 
knowledge that are common to my level of being. True identity 
will have to incorporate some elements that relate to higher 
levels of being (e.g. God, the ancestors and transcendent reality) 
and lower levels of being (e.g. the environment, other living 
creatures). This broadens the notion of individual identity from 
a single level validation, the multidimensional validation.
If one marries this multidimensional approach to consciousness 
with a recognition of both one’s interior and exterior lives, one 
comes to an understanding of consciousness, as a holon, having 
four dimensions (Figure 1). The individual and the collective, 
the interior and the exterior are all constituent elements of true 
consciousness and thus true identity.
What Wilber’s Holarchic model clearly shows is that true 
consciousness, and thus effective individual identity validation, 
requires more than just a subjective reflection on an individual 
interior experience, or an individual’s exterior sensory reality. 
Source: Wilber 1997:4
Figure 1: Ken Wilber’s four quadrants of consciousness
Source: Wilber 1997:4
FIGURE 1
Ken Wilber’s four quadrants of consciousness
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Moreover, it is also not sufficient to simply apply an objective 
observation of collective interior culture as expressed by the 
individual in a group, or collective exterior social interaction 
with other persons or surroundings, to validate true individual 
identity and consciousness.
Whilst these approaches may offer some tacit knowledge and 
insight into the identity of the person, true identity requires a far 
more rigorous and interactive engagement with the conscious 
being (not just a passive observation and reflection on static 
knowledge gained from the person’s subjective experience, or 
from observing the person objectively).
In short, an identity claim that comes closer to the truth of who 
one is must take cognisance of the interior and exterior life, it 
must heed individual and social characteristics and it must 
be based upon an understanding of its wholeness within the 
context of both higher and lower levels of consciousness.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
THE AFRICAN WORLD VIEW AND 
THE INTEGRATIVE APPROACH TO 
CONSCIOUSNESS AND IDENTITY
Within the debate of, and integrated approach to, consciousness, 
an African approach matches the most important criteria 
suggested above. This section of the paper will show where the 
African view of personhood enforces an ‘integrated approach’ to 
consciousness and being – thus helping to overcome the impasse 
of identity
The African world view overcomes, and corrects, many of the 
effects of radical dualism between self and other that have 
become so commonplace in the West. In particular, it deals 
with the notion that ‘truth’ is reality (in a static empirical sense). 
Truth, in this framework, is not known but discovered. 
Placide Tempels was one of the first persons to articulate clearly 
the essential tenets of the African world view in scholarly terms 
for a Western audience. He writes that the concept of ‘separate 
beings which find themselves side by side, entirely independent 
of one another, is foreign to Bantu thought’ (1959:58). He further 
says:
Bantu hold that created beings preserve a bond one of another, 
an intimate ontological relationship, comparable with the causal 
tie which binds creature and Creator. For the Bantu there is 
interaction of being with being, that is to say, of force with 
force.5 Transcending the mechanical, chemical and psychological 
interactions, they see a relationship of forces which we should call 
ontological.  
 (Tempels 1958:58) 
Such an approach is in contrast to the pervasive dualism that 
exists in much of modern Western scholarship. It was Rene 
Descartes’s ‘radical doubt’ that led him to the point of doubting 
everything, except the self who was doubting (or thinking). 
Hence his famous dictum; ‘I think therefore I am’ (cogito ergo 
sum). Mcunu points out that this led Descartes to reduce ‘the 
human person to a thinking mechanism and the body was seen 
as a separate substance from the mind’ (Mcunu 2004:24). Alexis 
Kagame, the Franco-African philosopher tests this assertion when 
setting out to evaluate Tempels’s theories through linguistic 
analysis. In his La philosophie Bantu-Rwandaise de l’etre (1966) he 
analyses the term ntu that can be roughly translated as ‘being’. 
Mudimbe’s summary of Kagame’s conclusion is that ‘the Bantu 
equivalent of to be is strictly and only performed as a copula. It 
does not express the notion of existence, and therefore cannot 
5.Balcomb points out that many African philosophers have taken issue with Tempels’s 
equation of ‘being’ and ‘force’ in African thought. Regardless, he notes that few have 
taken issue with the central assertion of his argument, that is, that ‘African ontology 
valorises the interconnectedness of all being’ (Balcomb 2004:70).
translate the Cartesian cogito’ (Mudimbe 1985:189). Balcomb 
notes the significance of this insight in saying that ‘the essence 
of African ontology, usually adumbrated in the expression “I am 
because others are, and because others are I am”, is diametrically 
opposed to the Cartesian schema’ (2004:71).
Below is Mudimbe’s (1985) summary of Kagame’s analysis of 
the root word ntu as an expression of African ontology:
In sum, the ntu is somehow a sign of a universal similitude. Its 
presence in beings brings them to life and attests to both their 
individual value and to the measure of their integration and dialectic 
of vital energy. ,’Ntu’ is both a uniting and a differentiating vital 
norm which explains the powers of vital inequality in terms of 
difference between beings. It is a sign that God, father of all beings 
… has put a stamp on the universe, thus making it transparent 
in a hierarchy of sympathy. Upwards one would read the vitality 
which, from minerals through vegetables, animals and humans, 
links stones to the departed and God himself. Downwards, it is a 
genealogical filiation of forms of beings, engendering or relating 
to one another, all of them witnessing to the original source that 
made them possible. 
(Mudimbe 1985:189–190)
Balcomb (2004) comments on the significance of this saying that:
The interconnectedness of the universe, beginning with the 
creator and going all the way down to rocks, can surely not be 
more strongly stated. Here is a system that is indeed a Cartesian 
nightmare and a Whiteheadian dream.
                          (Balcomb 2004:71)
The essential unity between self and others, as well as the self and 
the entire Kosmos, is a vitally important aspect in relating the 
African world view to an integrated approach to consciousness.6 
Edwards (1998:85–96) suggests at least three areas in which the 
African world view overlaps with the integrative approach. 
These areas are as follows:
•	 Firstly, both approaches express an understanding that 
existence is multidimensional and a dynamic process.7 
•	 Secondly, what is experienced, as the ‘phenomenal world’, 
is a continuously unfolding expression of a deeper, subtler, 
and yet equally real, form of reality.8 African spirituality, in 
particular, is very sensitive to the non-sensory and super-
sensory realm. Hence it avoids the pitfalls of the Western 
‘mono-dimensional, materialistic world-view’ (Edwards 
1998:95).
•	 Thirdly, existence consists of ‘nested holarchies’ (Wilber 
6.Of course many scholars will point to the erosion of this world view in African society. 
There can be no doubt that it would be naïve to assume that all Africans view the 
world in such an integrated manner. The effects of individualism, westernisation 
and the stigmatisation of African concepts of being have had a marked effect on 
the prominence of the African world view. (From modernising influences in schools 
and from ignorant religious movements in Christianity and Islam, there has been 
a significant effect in the breakdown of traditional African patterns of thought and 
resulting behaviour).
7.An example of the way in which the integrative approach relates to the African world 
view, in the context of this topic, is the negative influence that individualism and 
reductionism have had on the study of ontological identity. Western science and 
philosophy has sought to understand individual identity by simply investigating the 
inward (emotional, psychological) and outward (biological processes of the brain, 
social interactions) of individuals. The African approach is much more holistic, ask-
ing not only first-person questions (who are you? – psychology) and third-person 
questions (who do others say that you are? – sociology), but also by observing 
second-person interrelatedness (who are we? how does that inform who you are 
and who we perceive you to be?). In short, in the African approach, one cannot 
reduce identity simply to the experiences of the individual, or the perceptions of the 
group. One must employ an integrative approach that takes cognisance of both ap-
proaches and more. Wilber uses a wonderful metaphor to illustrate this. He writes: 
‘You can take the watch apart but it won’t tell you the time …’ (1996:25). Thus, 
wholeness is not found in the parts.
8.This notion is most clearly illustrated in the African understanding that there is no 
radical separation between spirit and matter, life and death. Rather, all of life is a 
continuum from one form of existence to another. Du Toit expresses this clearly 
when he writes: ‘For Africans there are no ontological gaps between existing enti-
ties. The Western natural–supernatural dualism is foreign to them. God, humankind, 
extrahumans and subhumans are all regarded as integral parts of a single totality of 
existence. God’s actions are not experienced as extra-ordinary. African metaphysi-
cal thinking is holistic …’ (Du Toit 2004:30).
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1996:99), in which the higher levels transcend and include 
the lower levels and where there is mutual inter-penetration 
of all entities within each level.9 The value of the African 
world view, with its emphasis on ‘being-human-together’,10 
is that it takes account of various levels of consciousness (i.e. 
it is pluridimensional,11 taking account not only of individual 
consciousness, but also collective consciousness, and even 
subtler forms of spiritual consciousness) (Edwards 1998:95).
 ‘UBUNTU’ AS A RELATIONAL 
ONTOLOGICAL APPROACH TO 
INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY
The importance of the ethics of ‘ubuntu’ in shaping identity 
in traditional African societies cannot be underestimated. 
Makhudu (1993) emphasises this when he writes:
Every facet of African life is shaped to embrace Ubuntu as a process 
and philosophy which reflects the African heritage, traditions, 
culture, customs, beliefs, value system and the extended family 
structures.
(Makhudu 1993:40)
This pervasive ethic relates to the notion of individual self-
validating identity in two ways that will be discussed in the 
sections that follow.
The vertical element: The wholeness and harmony 
of all reality (created and uncreated, seen and 
unseen)
In order to fully understand the ethics of ‘ubuntu’ it is necessary 
first to understand a fundamental aspect that underpins this 
ideological position – that is, the African world view places a 
significant emphasis on the ‘wholeness of all being’ (Setiloane 
1998:75). The African world view regards wholeness as a 
primary aspect of the Kosmos. This emphasis on wholeness 
can thus be discovered in all spheres of the African world view, 
beginning with God and ending in creation (Figure 2).
The concept of God in African religion
Kudadjie and Osei (2004:35) comment that there is no single 
view of God in relation to the Universe. However, there is a 
predominant understanding that all that exists comes from a 
Supreme Being.12 Moreover, it is God who sustains and provides 
for the created order through elements of sunshine, rain, fertility, 
good health and so on.
9.This process can be vividly illustrated when looking at the African understanding of 
the interrelationship between the ‘living’ and the ‘living dead’ (often referred to as the 
‘Ancestors’). The living, in base terms, have an influence upon the subtler, spiritual, 
realm of the living dead and this influence is reciprocal in nature. The attendance 
to traditional ceremonies to honour and include the ancestors brings joy to the 
ancestors and also encourages the ancestors to act benevolently towards the living 
(in many areas such as fertility, prominence in the community, wealth, health etc.) 
(cf. Thorpe 1991 chapter 7 for a detailed discussion of this interactive process). For 
a more detailed insight into this element of African traditional religion and thought 
see Louw 2001 and, for a detailed exposition the notion of ‘ubuntu’ as ‘extended 
family’, cf. Broodryk (1997a:14, 1997b:70f, 2002; Shutte 2001:18).
10.This is Edwards’s expression of the concept of ‘ubuntu’ that will be discussed in 
detail in the remainder of this chapter.
11.Wilber’s earlier thoughts on consciousness posited the notion that reality is 
pluridimensional in nature (i.e. made up of a plurality of dimensions). Plurality 
expresses the notion that more than one state can exist at one time. Multiplicity, on 
the other hand, suggests that there are different stages of existence, but that one 
moves from one to another (because there are many). For a detailed exposition of 
Wilber’s thesis of pluridimensional reality see Wilber 1975 ‘Psychologia perennis: 
The spectrum of consciousness’ and the somewhat adapted, The spectrum of 
consciousness (1977).
12.The Akamba of Kenya variously call God, Creator, Maker, Cleaver (Mbithi 1990:39). 
Whereas the Akan of Ghana describe God as Excavator, Hewer, Carver, Creator, 
Originator, Inventor and Architect (Danquah 1944:28, 30). The Akan, Banyarwanda 
(from Rwanda), Nuer (from Sudan), and Shona (from Zimbabwe) believe that God 
continues to create, using existing materials to mould and shape creation as a 
potter does (Maquet 1954:166).
The universe itself – comprising both seen and unseen reality 
(spirit beings, human beings, plants, animals, mountains, waters, 
stellar bodies, and all) is a whole, a community with symbolic 
influences and relationships. It is also commonly believed that, 
through the laws of nature and various spiritual forces, as well as 
human customs and institutions, God sustains and upholds the 
world. Thus, he maintains an orderly and harmonious world so 
that all can perform their own duties in it.
(Kudadjie & Osei 2004:36)
The Ancestors and the rest of the created order
In the African world view there is a strong belief that God is 
the overall governor and controller of the Universe. However, 
ancestors and spirit powers take part in the governance and 
administration of the natural order and human affairs (Mbiti 
1990:40). In order to maintain harmony in creation, one must 
thus seek to show respect to all living things (both those that 
are seen, and those that are not seen), that is, all of the created 
order (human beings, plants, animals) and the unseen world (the 
ancestors and spirit beings, as well as God). At times it would 
be necessary for a person, or group of persons, to perform some 
ritual action to restore the equilibrium in creation, or to influence 
or change a state of affairs (i.e. to seek healing, or prosperity, 
to ask for blessing, or guidance etc.) (Kudadjie & Osei 2004:37).
Hence, the maintenance of harmony and equilibrium in the 
wholeness of creation is of fundamental importance in the African 
world view. Human persons are part of a much wider, and very 
significant, community of living beings. Social relationships 
and identity within this community are extremely important. 
Who I am, what my role is and how I contribute towards the 
wholeness of the community (both seen and unseen) is essential 
to maintaining balance and keeping God, the ancestors and 
spirit beings at peace. This further maintains peace and harmony 
in the life of the individual and the extended community.
Thus, my identity is fundamentally related to higher and 
lower levels of life, to other humans and to my own interior 
life. Moreover, since identity is relational, it emerges out of an 
active engagement with the whole of the Kosmos; it is not just 
an observation of either subjective or objective data, rather, it is 
an active, intersubjective element of being in harmony with all 
other beings.
The horizontal element: Compassionate, humble 
engagement through the ethics of ‘ubuntu’ in 
order to foster dignity
In order to maintain the respectful equilibrium of the Kosmos, 
African philosophy developed an aphorism to express the 
fundamental identity and responsibility of the privileged human 
Figure 2: The vertical element: The wholeness and harmony of all reality
FIGURE 2
The vertical element: The wholeness and harmony of all reality
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position in the cosmic order: Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu13 
(translated from Zulu into Sotho it reads – Motho ke motho ka 
batho). This statement is often translated as: ‘a person is a person 
through other persons’14 (Ramose 1999:49f; Shutte 1993:46).
The meaning of the term ‘ubuntu’
At the heart of the above statement is the word ‘ubuntu’, 
which variously means ‘humanity’, ‘humanness’, or even 
‘humaneness’. 
These translations involve a considerable loss of culture-specific 
meaning. But, be that as it may, generally speaking, the maxim 
‘ubuntu ngumumntu ngabantu’ articulates a basic respect and 
compassion for others…. As such, it is both a factual description 
and a rule of conduct or social ethic. It not only describes human 
being as ‘being-with-others’, but also prescribes how we should 
relate to others, i.e. what ’being-with-others’ should be all about. 
(Louw 2001:1)
Linguistically, Mfenyana asserts that for one to fully understand 
the meaning of the word ‘ubuntu’ it is necessary to separate the 
prefix ‘ubu’ from the root ‘-ntu’ (1986:2).15 This is because the 
word ‘ubuntu’ qualifies the noun umuntu (meaning the human 
person). These words are common in many southern African 
languages, for example, ‘in isiXhosa it is Umntu, in isiZulu 
it is umuntu’ (Mcunu 2004:30, original emphasis). In terms of 
the word ‘ubuntu’, ubu refers to the abstract, whereas -ntu is a 
reference to the ancestor who spawned human society and gave 
human beings their way of life. Thus, 
[i]t is a communal way of life which deems that society must be 
run for the sake of all, requiring cooperation as well as sharing and 
charity … Ubuntu consequently, is the quality of being human.
(Broodryk 2002:13)
Thus, the term ‘ubuntu’ can be applied descriptively, that is 
to say, one could hear someone saying a person has ‘ubuntu’ 
– ‘usibani bani ungumuntu’ (or in Sotho ‘mang mang o nale 
botho’), meaning ‘that person is a human’ or, ‘that person has 
“ubuntu”’.16 Thus one would say a person is umuntu (a human 
being) because he or she possesses or displays the characteristics 
of ‘ubuntu’. Naturally the opposite can also be said of a person 
or community. ‘… [O]ne would hear people saying, akamuntu 
walutho lowo (“that one has no use or help”). To this we must 
add that ubuntu is an art and quality of being human’ (Mcunu 
2004:31). 
13.At times it is expressed more fully as Umuntu ungumuntu ngabanye ngabantu.
14.Louw (2001:1) notes that many definitions of ‘ubuntu’ have been given by various 
philosophers and authors, all of which relate closely to the one given here (cf., for 
example, Bhengu 1996:1–12; Broodryk 1995:5f, 1997a:1–2, 1997b:27f; Pityana 
1999:144–145; Prinsloo 1994, 1995:2, 1998:41–43; Sindane 1994:1–2, 1995:8–9; 
Teffo 1995:1–2).
15.For further details on the now defunct ‘Sash Magazine’ please see the following Url: 
http://disa.nu.ac.za/journals/jourbsexpand.htm 
16.As a minister of the Methodist Church of southern Africa, I first came across this 
concept in the earlier 1990s whilst I was a minister serving in a black Church 
in a Township in the North-West Province. Many of my members were migrant 
labourers who worked on the mines. After the death of one of our members, we 
collected some monies within the community to take with us to the funeral in the 
Eastern Cape. When at the funeral, I heard one of the speakers paying tribute to 
our Church, saying something along the lines of ‘When our brother was in the mine 
we did not know that he lived there with humans (umuntu), but now we have seen 
how they care (‘ubuntu’). We now know that he lived there with humans (umuntu)’. 
It was the humane care of the community that defined them as human, not their 
biological makeup. This was the first time I truly began to understand the essence 
of ‘ubuntu’.
‘Ubuntu’ and relational ontology – An engagement of 
dignity
A central element of ‘ubuntu’ in relation to identity, is the 
understanding that personhood (both in social structure 
and identity) is never understood without reference to the 
community of dignity (Figure 3). Mcunu writes that the ‘best 
way of being a person according to African understanding of 
the human person is to have ubuntu’ and that ‘[u]buntu is the 
ideal stage of being a human person’ (2004:25). The unity and 
harmony of personhood expressed in ‘ubuntu’ ‘stretches from 
the world seen through the naked eye to the world of ancestors, 
the spirit world’ (2004:25). Berglund (1976) records the following 
statement from a traditional African healer (sangoma):
Whites have failed to see that in Africa a human being is an entity, 
not in the first instance divided up into various sections such as 
the physical body, the soul and spirit. When a Zulu is sick it is the 
whole man that is sick, his physical as well as his spiritual being 
that is affected. 
 (Berglund 1976:82)
Moreover, not only does the African concept of ‘ubuntu’ express 
the fundamental unity of the spiritual and material worlds, 
it also clearly holds to the notion that identity is developed 
through interaction, over time. As a person participates with 
others and the environment, the person’s identity (who the 
person is in society, who the person sees him or herself to 
be and the community’s relation to the person) changes.17 
‘Personhood should be seen as going through the stages of 
human development or growth, namely, birth, living and death’ 
(Mcunu 2004:27, see also Kamalu 1998:31). In fact this process 
does not end at death. The Zulu people of southern Africa 
never spoke of a person’s death in the manner in which death is 
spoken of today (i.e. as final – an end to the person’s life). ‘They 
will say udlulile emhlabeni, meaning that a person has passed on 
to another stage of life. This implies clearly that a person never 
loses his/her personhood at “death”’ (Mcunu 2004:27). Thus, 
participation, from birth, through life and beyond this life, is key 
to the identity and role of the human person.
… [T]he essence of being is participation in which humans are 
always interlocked with one another… the human being is not only 
a ‘vital force’, but more a ‘vital force’ in participation.
(Setiloane 1986:14)
More directly to the point, and of cardinal value to the central 
thrust of this paper, Du Toit (2004) writes the following about 
‘ubuntu’, with a clear application for the theme of this paper:
In Africa, a person is identified by his or her interrelationships 
and not primarily by individualistic properties. The community 
identifies the person and not the person the community. The 
identity of the person is his or her place in the community. In 
Africa it is a matter of ‘I participate, therefore I am’18… Ubuntu 
is the principle of ‘I am only because we are, and since we are, 
therefore I am’. Ubuntu is African humanism. 
 (Du Toit 2004:33)
17.In fact, this concept is most clearly expressed in the various rites of passage that an 
African person goes through from birth to adulthood, from adulthood into marriage, 
from marriage to parenthood, from parenthood to being an elder, and eventually to 
the status of passing beyond this life to being a member of the ‘living dead’, that is, 
an Ancestor. Mcunu notes these various stages of human development in relation 
to the African concept of personhood in his Masters thesis (2004:27–28).
18.Here Du Toit references Shutte 1993:46–51.
Figure 3: The horizontal element: Compassion and humbleness through the ethics of ‘ubuntu’
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This notion is attested to by both Mcunu and Setiloane, who 
affirm that, ‘ubuntu is the manifestation of humanity and the 
divine … It is the oneness of being and oneness with all spheres 
[of existence]’ (Mcunu 2004:36; cf. Setiloane 1986:16). This ethic 
of harmony with higher and lower life forms is central to the 
integrative approach.
Intersubjectivity – A shared dignity that is more than 
just a functional relationship
Attention needs to be given to the elements of the ethics of 
‘ubuntu’ in relation to the active engagement in horizontal 
relationships that shape who one is. True identity is not only 
based on the tasks or roles of the individuals, it is a true 
intersubjective identity that is shaped in and through shared life 
in the community. Du Toit (2004) goes on to write that, 
[f]or Africans, to be human is to participate in life and respect 
the conditions that make life possible. To participate in life means 
ultimately to participate in the fellowship of the community. 
African community-based society does not designate a communal 
or collectivist society, but rather one reminiscent of an organism. 
The collectivist society inevitably places the emphasis on the 
individual and his or her needs. African society emphasises 
solidarity rather than activity, and the communion of persons 
rather than their autonomy … That personhood is identified by 
an individual’s interaction with other persons does not eliminate 
personal identity … It simply says that my personal identity comes 
to the fore in my interaction with, and place in, my community. 
 (Du Toit 2004:33; cf. Louw 2001:10)
Louw points out that one of the emphases of the ‘ubuntu’ ethic 
in post-apartheid South Africa has been to ‘create a balance 
between complete individual autonomy and homonymy, i.e. 
to broaden respect for the individual and purge collectivism of 
its negative elements’ (2001:10). He clearly makes the point that 
‘oppressive communalism’, which robs persons of their identity 
and rights, as is seen in many places throughout Africa and the 
world, is not the intended outcome of the ‘ubuntu’ ethic in the 
African world view (Louw 2001:10). He supports his argument 
by referring to Ndaba (1994), who writes that,
… the collective consciousness evident in the African culture does 
not mean that the African subject wallows in a formless, shapeless 
or rudimentary collectivity … [Rather, it] means that the African 
subjectivity develops and thrives in a relational setting provided 
by ongoing contact and interaction with others.
(Ndaba 1994:14)
True ‘ubuntu’, Louw points out, operates in a dialogical manner, 
it incorporates both ‘relation and distance’ (2001:10). ‘It preserves 
the other in her otherness, in her uniqueness, without letting her 
slip into the distance’ (Louw 2001:10–11).19 Shutte echoes this 
in writing, ‘the community is not opposed to the individual, 
nor does it simply swallow the individual up; it enables each 
individual to become a unique centre of shared life’ (2001:9). 
Dignity and respect: One of the primary reasons why this ‘life 
orientation’ is able to work is because of the notions of dignity 
and respect. ‘Respect entails listening to the other person and it 
also involves humility, honesty and treating others as you want 
them to treat you’ (Mcunu 2004:36).20 Mcunu acknowledges that, 
at times, Westerners have been critical of ‘ubuntu’, suggesting 
that the emphasis on community overlooks the uniqueness 
and distinctness of human persons. Of course, such things do 
happen in reality and can often lead to abusive and unhealthy 
communities. However, such an abusive community would not 
be in keeping with the true sense of the African world view; 
in short, such an abusive community would be deemed as 
19.See the following supporting references, Shutte 1993:49, 51 and Macquarrie 
1972:110.
20.However, both Du Toit and Mcunu point to the reality that poverty and struggle 
in Africa have often eroded this respectful, dignity-based world view of mutual 
dependence and cooperation (Du Toit 2004:33; Mcunu 2004:36).
devoid of ‘ubuntu’ (cf. Shutte 2001:9). Mcunu (2004) writes from 
personal experience of African community saying, 
I agree with Shutte, because the community nurtures the individual 
and coaches the individual as the community promotes his/her 
human development. The community norms are there to ensure 
that [the] individual person is helped towards self-realisation and 
self-actualisation. 
(Mcunu 2004:39) 
It is thus essential to note that individual identity is based upon a 
complex active interrelationship of beings that share a common 
meaning in community. This can most accurately be described 
as an intersubjective (shared ontological) approach to identity 
(Figure 4).
Eugene de Quincey (2005) describes this notion of intersubjective 
identity as follows:
Intersubjectivity is ‘knowing through relationship’ – a form of 
non-sensory, non-linguistic connection through “presence” and 
“meaning”, rather than through mechanism or exchanges of 
energy… intersubjectivity [is]… ‘consciousness as communion’. 
(De Quincey 2005:2)
Thus, if one were to apply the dialogical conceptual framework 
of ‘I–Thou’ developed by Martin Buber in his philosophical 
essay Ich un Du (1923),21 one would be able to show that, in 
the African world view, it is neither the ‘I’ (individual) nor the 
‘Thou’ (community) that takes ontological primacy. Rather, the 
ontological primacy is focused on the hyphen, the ‘between’, of 
the I–Thou. Ramose (1999) writes:
The African concept of a person as wholeness does not deny human 
individuality as an ontological fact, as an analytic finitude, but 
ascribes ontological primacy to the community through which the 
human individual comes to know both themselves and the world 
around them.
(Ramose 1999:79)
Since Ramose is not addressing the three elements presented 
above (the ‘I’, the ‘between’ and the ‘Thou’), his reference focuses, 
almost exclusively, on the individual within the community. 
However, the weight of the statement rests in the words ‘to the 
community through which the individual comes to know …’. 
21.First translated into English in 1937, see Gregor Smith 1937.
Source: De Quincy 2005:206
Figure 4: Eugene de Quincey’s interpretation of Ken Wilber’s four quadrants of consciousness
Source: De Quincy 2005:206
FIGURE 4
 Eugene de Quincey’s interpretation of Ken Wilber’s four quadrants of 
consciousness
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Inadvertently, he makes this crucial point about where the true 
primacy of being lies. Neither the individual, in isolation, nor 
the community, apart from the individuals which are together 
the community, shape meaning. Rather, true meaning comes 
from mutual interrelationship, the ‘between’, of the individual 
and the community. It is the individual that enriches, builds up, 
maintains and develops the community. Whilst, on the other 
hand, it is the community that enriches, builds up, maintains and 
develops the individual. This can be seen in the two phrases that 
are used with reference to individuals in the isiZulu language, 
namely, izithopo (which praises the individual, in the assumption 
of unique talent and giftedness, achievements and ability) and 
izithakazelo (which locates that giftedness, talent, ability and 
endeavour found in the person as belonging within the clan or 
community). 
‘Izithopo’ are attributes of the individual person and his/her 
unique role in the community. ‘Izithakazelo’ are what I share with 
the community and how I relate to the community … This shows 
that there is a mutual fraternity between the greater community 
and human individuality.
 (Mcunu 2004:40)
Shutte has likened the African community to a living organism 
‘rather than an artificial whole’ (Shutte 2001:26). In a living 
organism, such as a person, it is neither the individual cells nor the 
whole body which are more important, but the intercommunion 
between the two, which is the life of that organism, that is most 
important. Ruch and Anyawu (1984) write:
The whole African society, living and living-dead are a living 
network of relations almost like that between the various parts of 
an organism. When one part of the body is sick the whole body is 
affected. When one member of the family or clan is honoured or 
successful, the whole group rejoices and shares in the glory, not 
only psychologically but ontologically: each member of the group 
is really part of the honour.22 
(Ruch & Anyawu 1984:143)
Thus, the notion of personhood and identity is achieved in the 
interaction between the individual and the community, as has 
already been shown, and the content and values of this interaction 
(as well as the description of the harmony of such interaction) is 
found and expressed in the ethics of ‘ubuntu’. Shutte summed 
up the intersubjective aspect of ‘ubuntu’ succinctly in one of 
his various translations of the phrase ubuntu ngumumtu abantu, 
when he writes, ‘I participate, therefore I am’ (1993:46 –51). This 
same intersubjective understanding is substantiated by Mcunu: 
‘It is this ontology that sets African anthropology distinct, not 
separate, from Western anthropology’ (2004:41).
Furthermore, intersubjectivity from an African perspective 
suggests that a person grows more fully human, more truly in 
their identity, through engagement with other persons. Shutte 
(2004) presents the essence of this African perspective in writing 
that:
The key idea here is that a human person exists and develops as a 
person only in relation to other persons. The human self is not to 
be seen as something already formed and present in each human 
individual at birth. Instead, [the person] is still to be formed in 
the course of living. And it can only come into existence through 
the gift and influence of others. It is thus in no way material, 
something inside the body or the individual as for example, a mind-
brain identity theorist might surmise. Insofar as it exists in a place 
it exists outside the body, in relation to other persons and the whole 
material environment. It is truer to the African idea, however, to 
see self and other as co-existing, each in the other in the sense of 
being identified with each other. The fundamental human reality 
must be seen as a field of personal energy in which each individual 
emerges as a distinct pole or focus. The field of life is the same in 
each; in each it is their humanity. All persons form a single person, 
not as parts for a whole, but as friends draw their life and character 
from the spirit of a common friend. They have a common identity. 
(Shutte 2004:52−53)
22.When celebrating the honour of a member of the community the following is often 
said, ‘ingane yethu iyiphakamisile indawo yethu’ (our child has done us proud in 
our community) (Mcunu 2004:41).
De Quincey (2005) points out that this realisation is becoming 
increasingly popular in a variety of academic disciplines, from 
systems theory, to quantum science, consciousness studies 
and, of course, the rediscovery of the perennial philosophy 
of the world’s spiritual traditions. He writes that all of these 
contributions tell us that, as individuals,
… we are definitely not alone … we don’t form relationships, 
they form us. We are constituted by webs of interconnection. 
Relationship comes first, and we emerge as more or less distinct 
centers within the vast and complex networks that surround us. In 
this new view, we are noted in the complex web of life. Each of us 
is a meeting point, a center of convergence, for countless threads of 
relationship. We are moments in time and locations in space where 
the universe shows up – literally, as a phenomenon (from the Greek 
“phainomenon”, ‘to appear’ or ‘to show’). In other words, in this 
“new story” we emerge as subjects from intricate networks of 
interrelatedness, from webs of intersubjectivity. 
(De Quincey 2005:182)
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have attempted to show the deficiency of purely 
objective and subjective approaches to individual identity that 
are based upon the concept of ‘foundational knowledge’. As an 
alternative, I have sought to present a more ‘generous ontology’ 
that is based upon an intersubjective understanding of the fluid 
formation of identity, particularly as this arises out of the ethics 
of ‘ubuntu’.
I have argued that, in African intersubjectivity, a person is a only 
a person through their relation to other persons. The question 
‘who am I?’ (subjective) is intricately related to ‘who you say 
that I am’ (objective) and ‘who we are together’ (intersubjective). 
Instead of being a lone subject, or a quantifiable and containable 
object, we are all ‘intersubjects’, fundamentally interwoven into 
a common cosmic identity; human beings that are run through 
with sacred dignity. It is not just me, it is not just you, it is not 
just the material reality, neither is it just the spiritual reality; true 
reality is a sacred interweaving of all these things – true reality 
is beyond one single quantifiable truth, it is generous. True 
identity, in this sense, is a dynamic engagement and discovery 
of mutual identity and shared dignity – that is, a generous 
ontology.
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